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Borrowing a measure from ecology, we introduce a spatial dispersion index to quantify the ﬁrm traits
related to ﬁrm geographic location and investigate ﬁrm exposure to local home bias and local investor
risk tolerance as determinants of corporate market value. Consistent with the investor preference for
local stocks, we ﬁnd listed ﬁrms beneﬁt from a location premium that increases with ﬁrm isolation
and local investor wealth. IPOs and delistings are found to affect the market value of neighboring listed
ﬁrms: isolated ﬁrms decrease in value when they cluster due to local IPOs while clustered ﬁrms increase
in value as they become more isolated due to local delistings. Local ﬁrm clustering and risk tolerance also
affect IPO underpricing. Empirical ﬁndings depict a framework where IPOs and delistings are locally
jointly determined.
 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Basic asset-allocation principles notwithstanding (e.g.,
Detemple et al., 2005; Farinelli et al., 2008), a disproportionately
large proportion of equity portfolios is invested in geographically
proximate stocks (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Ivkovic´ and
Weisbenner, 2005). As a consequence, the ﬁrm geographic location
affects corporate market value (e.g., Hong et al., 2008; Korniotis
and Kumar, 2013). Given that a portion of local wealth is invested
in local equity (Local Home Bias, henceforth LHB), the short supply
of local stocks pushes market prices of geographically isolated
ﬁrms up, and vice versa when local stocks are plentiful (the LHB
effect). The value implications, when there are changes to the set
of local companies available for investment, have been never
addressed in the literature. We ﬁll this gap by investigating the
value implications as neighboring ﬁrms go public (local IPOs) and
private (local delistings). In addition, we test whether the local
supply and demand for local stocks also affect IPO underpricing.
Our analysis offers improved methodology, supports the idea that
ﬁrm geographic location is a non-negligible asset-pricing factor,
and traces a conceptual framework whereby IPOs and delistings
are locally and jointly determined.The LHB stems from informational advantages on local stocks
(e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 2001), though behavioral factors also
come into play (e.g., Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001), primarily
affects smaller, opaque, and less recognizable ﬁrms (Coval and
Moskowitz, 1999; Zhu, 2003; Ivkovic´ and Weisbenner, 2005), and
is correlated with poorly-educated male individuals, especially
employees in public administration with no experience in risky
investments (Karlsson and Nordén, 2007). Consistent with the
LHB, Hong et al. (2008) (HKS) ﬁnd that the market-to-book is
inversely related to the ratio of the equity book value of local listed
ﬁrms (i.e., the local supply of stocks) and the disposable income of
local households (i.e., the local demand for stocks). More simply,
ﬁrms trade at a premium when they are headquartered in rich
areas where there are few local ﬁrms available for investment.
Our analysis improves upon the HKS approach. The relation
between the ﬁrm location and the market value is also addressed
in this paper. First, our contribution introduces into the ﬁnancial
literature the Johnson and Zimmer (1985) spatial dispersion index
(henceforth noted as I). Previously adopted in the ecology litera-
ture to measure the tendency of living organisms to form clusters
(e.g., Gomelyuk and Shchetkov, 1999; Lee et al., 2006), we imple-
ment the I-index to proxy the ﬁrm characteristics that are related
to ﬁrm geographic location. The I-index allows us to deﬁne a
ﬁrm-speciﬁc value of clustering around the ﬁrm headquarters with
respect to location-related ﬁrm attributes. We speciﬁcally consider
two attributes: the location of the other listed ﬁrms (on the
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market demand side). Our analysis attempts to deﬁne the portion
of corporate market value that is attributable to the LHB, to local
investor wealth, and ultimately, to ﬁrm geographic location (loca-
tion premium). Most importantly, we provide evidence that varia-
tions in the location premium are caused by variations in the set of
local companies. In fact, there are only three sources of variation:
(i) local IPOs, causing local ﬁrms to become more clustered; (ii)
local delistings, causing local ﬁrms to become more isolated; and
(iii) the relocation of the headquarters, which, from a local per-
spective, acts as a simultaneous local IPO for the new hosting area
and a local delisting for the old area.1 In line with previous ﬁndings
for the LHB, we conjecture that local IPOs decrease the location pre-
mium of listed (local) ﬁrms, while local delistings have the opposite
effect and increase the location premium of listed (local) ﬁrms. To
provide additional results that should further support these conjec-
tures, we test the relation between the IPO ﬁrst-day return and the
ﬁrm location. Firms located in areas with higher income clustering
and lower concentration of local listed ﬁrms should exhibit a higher
location premium and thus larger underpricing.
We analyze the Italian ﬁrms listed on the Milan Stock Exchange
(MSE) over the period 1999–2007. Our results indicate that the
corporate market value drops with the proximity to other listed
ﬁrms and rises with the proximity to investor income; the overall
location premium accounts for approximately 0.7 of the market-
to-book value. We ﬁnd the location premium varies due to local
IPOs and delistings. We divide our sample of ﬁrms into four clus-
ters based on their distance from the other listed ﬁrms: Cluster 1
groups the highly isolated ﬁrms, and cluster 4 groups the highly
clustered ﬁrms. The aggregation effect of local IPOs decreases the
value of highly isolated ﬁrms by approximately 20%, while the iso-
lation effect of local delistings increases the value of the highly
clustered ﬁrms by approximately 35%. In addition, even the IPO
ﬁrst-day return increases with issuing ﬁrm isolation from other
listed ﬁrms and proximity to investor wealth.
Methodologically, the ﬁnancial literature is improved by the
Johnson and Zimmer dispersion index. Similar to living organisms,
companies interact with each other and with their surrounding
environment. The outcomes of these interactions are responsible
for ﬁrm proﬁtability and probability of survival. Spinoffs from ecol-
ogy, which is the study of these relationships, appear to be suitable
for investigating causations in corporate ﬁnance. Indeed, the I-
index of dispersion emerges as the most powerful proxy thus far
for ﬁrm traits related to location. Recent research has amply inves-
tigated many ﬁrm traits related to ﬁrm location such as the effect
of corporate geographic dispersion on liquidity or the cost of debt
(among the ﬁrst examples, see Loughran and Schultz, 2005; and
later Loughran, 2008; Arena and Dewally, 2012). For instance,
Loughran and Schultz (2005) distinguish urban from rural ﬁrms
in their distance from the major U.S. metropolitan areas and ﬁnd
that rural stocks are less liquid than urban stocks. Arena and
Dewally (2012) indicate that urban ﬁrms face a lower cost of debt
and attract more prestigious bank syndicates than rural ﬁrms. In
addition, Gao et al. (2008), Landier et al. (2009), and García and
Norli (2012) investigate the effects of the corporate geographic dis-
persion on corporate market value, corporate decision making, and
stock returns. All of these studies employed a range of proxies for
corporate geographic dispersion including the number of regions
where subsidiaries are located (Gao et al., 2008), the proportion
of divisions in the home state (Landier et al., 2009), and even the
number of states mentioned in annual reports (García and Norli,
2012). In all of these cases, companies are categorized (e.g.,1 Relocating headquarters is a very rare phenomenon. HKS ﬁnd just 23 switchers,
i.e., ﬁrms that moved their headquarters from one census region to another over the
period 1970–2005. Similarly, we ﬁnd just 13 switchers.dispersed vs. nondispersed or local vs. nonlocal) using an ex ante
deﬁned threshold (e.g., regions, states, etc.) and ignoring the pat-
tern of the location attributes outside the threshold (e.g., ﬁrms
located in the neighboring regions), with obvious disadvantages
in measurement accuracy. The Johnson and Zimmer dispersion
index values of subsidiaries, divisions, and areas of interest should
be signiﬁcantly better proxies for the ﬁrm geographic dispersion
because the I-index avoids incorporating any exogenous assump-
tions and is fully determined by the complete spatial distribution
of the considered ﬁrm location attributes.
From the empirical standpoint, our results support the prior
ﬁndings in the literature and expand the current understanding
of the geographic components in price formation (e.g., Pirinsky
and Wang, 2006; Arena and Dewally, 2012; García and Norli,
2012). The ﬁgures indicate that ﬁrm geographic location emerges
as a non-negligible asset-pricing factor, which has an effect of
the same magnitude on corporate market value as that of the
ROE. In fact, even among relatively close local ﬁrms (e.g., no more
than 300 km apart), location premium differences are not trivial
(e.g., from 6% to 8%). Apart from the obvious implications for aca-
demics and practitioners, these ﬁndings could also have policy
implications as both private and listed isolated ﬁrms are expected
to gain from their ‘‘spatial status’’ (i.e., a large audience of ‘‘dedi-
cated’’ investors): Isolated IPOs or isolated SEOs should face a
lower risk of failure. In a similar vein, Korniotis and Kumar
(2013) conclude that ‘‘local clientele-induced geographical seg-
mentation implies that ﬁrms can alter their cost of capital by relo-
cating headquarters’’ (Korniotis and Kumar, 2013, p. 1093). Our
results on underpricing strongly support their conclusions.
Our results also contribute to the IPO and delistings literature.
First, we offer new insights on the underpricing puzzle (e.g.,
Ritter and Welch, 2002): The higher underpricing of isolated IPOs
is consistent with a myopia of actors taking part to the going public
process (e.g., underwriters), who do not seem to properly take into
account the LHB effect in the IPO price-setting process. Second, our
ﬁndings on the asset-pricing implications of local IPOs and delis-
tings are new to the literature and join the recent contributions
by Braun and Larrain (2009), Colaco et al. (2009) and Hsu et al.
(2010) whereby IPOs are investigated as an integrated phenome-
non that interacts with the surrounding economic environment
rather than as a stand-alone corporate event. Our results for delis-
tings introduce this same integrated perspective into the ongoing
public-to-private transactions debate (e.g., Renneboog and
Simons, 2005; Renneboog et al., 2007; Baran and King, 2010;
Achleitner et al., 2013; Boubakri et al., 2013; Fidrmuc et al.,
2013; Croci and Del Giudice, 2014). In fact, IPOs and delistings
emerge as local substitutes: The delistings of local ﬁrms would free
space and extant local resources, thus increasing the success of
local IPOs and vice versa. We believe there is ample room for future
research.
Finally our results also contribute to the so-called agglomera-
tion economies (e.g., Marshall, 1920; Rosenthal and Strange,
2004): Firms beneﬁt from clustering due to external economies
of scale such as the proximity to customers and suppliers (e.g.,
Krugman, 1991), the presence of a labor pool and infrastructures
(e.g., Enright, 2003), or knowledge spillovers (e.g., Audretsch and
Feldman, 1996). We provide evidence for the other side of the
debate on clustering, which has been neglected thus far. In fact,
the value enhancing effect of ﬁrm clustering appears to be at least
partly offset by a reduction in the location premium.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
illustrates the spatial dispersion indices and the empirical strategy.
Section 3 provides details on data and variables. Section 4 depicts
the anatomy of the implemented spatial indices. Section 5, Section
6 and Section 7 report the results. Section 8 contains robustness
checks. Section 9 concludes.
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We introduce the Johnson and Zimmer (1985) spatial disper-
sion index (I-index) as a method of capturing the ﬁrm-speciﬁc fea-
tures (or attributes) related to a ﬁrm’s geographic location. The I-
index is based on point-to-point individual distances. So, given a
two-dimensional Euclidean space, the generic point i and a sample
of other points r that are determined by the geographical coordi-
nates of latitude and longitude, the dispersion index I for i with
respect to r is computed as
PFig. 1. The Johnson a
spatial distribution of
axis). The Johnson an
of the points plotted
also reported in the gI ¼ ðr þ 1Þ
r
r¼1&r–iðd4i;rÞ
Pr
r¼1&r–iðd2i;rÞ
h i2where di,r is the shortest spherical distance between i and each of
the r points. The expected value of I is approximately two for a ran-
dom spatial distribution, lower than two for a scattered spatial dis-
tribution, and higher than two for a concentrated spatial
distribution. Essentially, while clustered points exhibit I values lar-
ger than two, isolated points will have an I value lower than two.
Fig. 1 displays an example of a possible spatial distribution of 20
points: The previously deﬁned value of the I-index determines the
size of the points plotted. In this example, point A records the low-
est I-index value (1.187), the farthest point from the other points,
while point B records the highest value of I-index (5.340), the clos-
est point to all other points. If we assume this example indicates
ﬁrm headquarters, ﬁrm A (with the lowest I-index value) is isolated
compared to other ﬁrm headquarters locations, while ﬁrm B (with
the highest I-index value) is likely part of a clustered spatial distri-
bution with other listed ﬁrms. A similar interpretation holds when
the points refer to household disposable income. Therefore, the I-
index addresses ﬁrm ‘‘subjective’’ spatial distribution or ﬁrm-spe-
ciﬁc ‘‘spatial status’’.
Taking into consideration the location of the other listed ﬁrms
and the location of investor wealth as two attributes of the ﬁrm
location, we propose two variables: I_FIRM and I_INCOME. I_FIRM
is deﬁned by I computed on the spatial distribution of other listed
ﬁrms. I_INCOME is the value of I based on the weighted distance
between each ﬁrm and each provincial capital city, where weights
are equal to the normalized provincial per capita household dis-
posable income. It follows that I_INCOME measures the disposable
income clustering around the ﬁrm assuming household wealth is
located in the center of the province where the household resides.nd Zimmer Spatial Dispersion Index. This ﬁgure displays the
20 points according to their latitude (y-axis) and longitude (x-
d Zimmer (1985) spatial dispersion index determines the size
. Latitude, longitude, and the I-index value of each point are
rid.In line with the example in Fig. 1, a higher value of I_FIRM indicates
a higher concentration of listed ﬁrms around the ﬁrm headquar-
ters. Because the local investor demand for local stocks will be
divided among all of the ﬁrms in a given local area, all other things
being equal, the LHB effect is expected to be low. Therefore, I_FIRM
(inversely) proxies for the ﬁrm exposure to LHB. On the other hand,
a high value of I_INCOME indicates that investor wealth is locally
concentrated around the issuing ﬁrm headquarters or, more sim-
ply, that the local investors are richer than elsewhere. As in HKS
and Aabo et al. (2013), we assume the local investor risk tolerance
is proportional to the local wealth. Hence, I_INCOME measures the
investor risk tolerance around the issuing ﬁrm headquarters.
I_FIRM and I_INCOME provide several advantages over previous
measures of ﬁrm traits related to the spatial dimension (e.g., Gao
et al., 2008; HKS; García and Norli, 2012). First, I_FIRM and
I_INCOME do not incorporate any exogenous assumptions about
locality. This is a clear advantage in cases such as Bolzoni S.p.A.,
a sampled ﬁrm headquartered in the northeastern region of Italy,
Emilia-Romagna. For instance, using the HKS approach whereby
local ﬁrms are deﬁned as ﬁrms headquartered within the same
census region, the LHB effect for Bolzoni S.p.A. would be proxied
by the ratio (RATIO) of the equity book value of listed ﬁrms and
the disposable income of households in Emilia-Romagna. However,
Bolzoni S.p.A is an average of 121 km away from other ﬁrms in
Emilia-Romagna but only 70 km (on average) away from ﬁrms
headquartered in the contiguous region of Lombardy (northwest-
ern Italy). In fact, the LHB faced by Bolzoni S.p.A. is signiﬁcantly
biased when estimated by the RATIO. On the other hand, the sec-
ond advantage to using I_FIRM and I_INCOME is that they are fully
endogenously determined by the complete spatial distributions of
the related ﬁrm location attributes. For example, while RATIO is
deﬁned only for within-region ﬁrms, I_FIRM considers the spatial
distribution of all sampled ﬁrms. There are some clear advantages
in accurately measuring the LHB. For example, when contiguous
areas with heterogeneous ﬁrm populations are addressed, the
RATIO overestimates (underestimates) the LHB of the less popu-
lated (more populated) area. Similar arguments hold for I_INCOME.
Finally, because I_FIRM and I_INCOME are ﬁrm-speciﬁc rather than
local-speciﬁc measures, they allow for different location premiums
among the local ﬁrms, while previous approaches imply the same
location premium for all local ﬁrms. In addition, I_FIRM and
I_INCOME allow the supply side LHB effect to be disentangled from
the investor risk tolerance effect on the demand side.
We investigate the relations between the market-to-book and
the ﬁrm location attributes by ﬁrst proxying the location attributes
through the HKS RATIO. Consistent with previous evidence, we
expect to observe a negative relation between RATIO and mar-
ket-to-book. Then, we introduce I_FIRM and I_INCOME. I_FIRM is
expected to be inversely related to market-to-book, while
I_INCOME is expected to be directly related. As per Ivkovic´ and
Weisbenner (2005), we also distinguish ﬁrms in and out of the pri-
mary Italian equity market index (FTSE MIB Index, henceforth FTSE
MIB), and we expect ﬁrms in the FTSE MIB to be less affected by
RATIO, I_FIRM and I_INCOME than ﬁrms not in the FTSE MIB. The
conﬁrmation of this hypothesis should remove any doubt that
we are actually targeting the LHB and conﬁrm the effectiveness
of I_FIRM and I_INCOME.
Then, we address the dynamic aspect of the location premium
by analyzing the variations induced by IPOs and delistings. Local
IPOs increase the set of local companies available for investment,
leaving the portion of investor portfolio invested in local stocks
unchanged. Therefore, all other things being equal, we expect that
due to local IPOs, more spatially clustered ﬁrms experience a
decreased LHB effect and location premium. Similar but opposite
dynamics are predicted for local delistings, with an increase in
the LHB effect and location premium. We argue that the initial
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ing effects of local IPOs and delistings. Therefore, we expect that
the decrease (increase) in the LHB effect caused by an increase
(decrease) in the number of local listed ﬁrms, due to IPOs (delis-
tings), becomes progressively smaller (higher) the more the issuing
ﬁrm was originally clustered (isolated). In essence, we predict that
the effect of a local IPO in areas with only a few local ﬁrms (e.g.,
one local ﬁrm) is higher than the effect of a local IPO in areas with
several local ﬁrms (e.g., 100 local ﬁrms) because, in the ﬁrst sce-
nario, the portfolio of local ﬁrms to invest in effectively doubles
and, in the second scenario, the increase in local equity is only
equal to 1%.
Operationally, our ﬁrst step is to perform the cluster analysis of
I_FIRM. The dynamic analysis we propose requires testing the rela-
tion between the variations of market-to-book and the variations
of I_FIRM. Because I_FIRM varies any time there is an IPO or a
delisting regardless of whether it is local, I_FIRM variations cannot
necessarily capture the changes in ﬁrm spatial status from a local
perspective. On the other hand, effective variations in the LHB
effect can be predicted for all listed ﬁrms that are less (more)
traded following an IPO (delisting) when local investors re-weight
their portfolios based on the new set of available local stocks.
Therefore, effective I_FIRM variations only hold for local ﬁrms or,
formally, for ﬁrms belonging to the same spatial cluster. The clus-
ter analysis addresses this issue by endogenously grouping local
ﬁrms. Ultimately, the cluster analysis provides us with a clustered
version of I_FIRM, designated I_FIRMCL, which is given values from
one to four (the cluster value) as the number of ﬁrms within the
cluster increases. In fact, I_FIRMCL deﬁnes the ﬁrm spatial status
with respect to the other local ﬁrms only. Appendix B reports the
steps of cluster analysis.
We address the variations in the location premium due to local
IPOs and delistings by investigating the relations between the mar-
ket-to-book and variations of I_FIRMCL. We split I_FIRMCL into the
previous year’s value (I FIRMCLt1) plus the year variation
(I FIRMCLDt). While I FIRM
CL
t1 refers to the portion of location pre-
mium that can be attributed to the initial level of clustering,
I FIRMCLDt refers to the location premium decrease (increase) due
to a positive (negative) variation in ﬁrm local clustering caused
by local IPOs (delistings). We also add the cross-product term of
the former with the latter (I FIRMCLt1  I FIRMCLDt). This correction
term takes into account the initial level of ﬁrm clustering. While
I FIRMCLt1 is always expected to be inversely related to market-
to-book, I FIRMCLDt and I FIRM
CL
t1  I FIRMCLDt are predicted to be neg-
atively and positively related to market-to-book, respectively, due
to local IPOs. The opposite is expected for local delistings.
Finally, to further strengthen our analysis, we address the rela-
tion between the underpricing and the ﬁrm location. More specif-
ically, we investigate the relation between the IPO ﬁrst-day return
and I_FIRM and I_INCOME. I_FIRM is predicted to be inversely
related to the IPO ﬁrst-day return meaning that isolated IPOs are
more underpriced than clustered IPOs; I_INCOME is predicted to
be directly related to the IPO underpricing.3. Data, variable deﬁnition, and methodology
3.1. Data sources and sample selection
We investigated several different data sources: (i) the databases
provided by Consob (i.e., the Italian regulator) for our sample; (ii)
Osiris (Bureau Van Dijk database) and Company Annual Reports
for data on ﬁrm location; (iii) the archives provided by Borsa Itali-
ana S.p.A. (the MSE’s managing company) for information on secu-
rities listings and IPO data; (iv) Amadeus (Bureau Van Dijk
database) for data on Italian private ﬁrms; (v) the electronicarchive of Il Sole 24Ore, the most prominent Italian ﬁnancial news-
paper, for press coverage; (vi) the investment guide Il Calepino
dell’Azionista for ﬁrm age; (vii) the databases of ISTAT (Italian Insti-
tute of Statistics) and Centro Studi Unioncamere (the research center
of the regional Chambers of Commerce) for information on wealth
distribution; and (viii) Datastream and Worldscope (Thompson
Financial) for all other accounting and ﬁnancial information. In
addition, NUTS Codes have been used to split Italy (NUTS0) into
three nested subareas, namely, the geographic macroareas
(NUTS1), Italian regions (NUTS2), and Italian provinces (NUTS3).
Finally, Google Maps allowed us to collect the geographic coordi-
nates (i.e., latitude and longitude) of each sampled ﬁrm headquar-
ters. Table A.1 in Appendix A summarizes the information sources.
Our initial sample consists of 2537 ﬁrm-year observations for
ﬁrms issuing common stock on the MSE over the period 1999–
2007. From the initial sample, we extracted observations (i) of
actively traded stocks, (ii) with ROE within a range of plus one
and minus one, and (iii) headquartered in Italy. The resulting
unbalanced panel data set consists of 2463 ﬁrm-year observations
(151 IPOs) and is our ﬁnal sample.
3.2. Methodology and deﬁnition of variables
The logarithmic transformation of the market-to-book ratio
(LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK)) is our left-hand side variable. As the main
explanatory variable, we start with RATIO (HKS). Consistent with
Guiso et al. (2004) and Hasan et al. (2009), we take RATIO at the
region level. Then, we replace RATIO with I_FIRM and I_INCOME.
Therefore, the static speciﬁcation of the ﬁrm location premium
we test is:
LNðMARKET-TO-BOOKÞi;t ¼ c0 þ c1  I FIRMi;t þ c3  I INCOMEi;t
þ c  Controlsi;t þ ei;t ð1Þ
Within this analysis, we distinguish the ﬁrms included in the FTSE
MIB (FTSE-FIRMS) from those excluded (NON-FTSE-FIRMS) through
the interacting dummy variable FTSE_D. Consistent with previous
ﬁndings (e.g., Gygax and Otchere, 2010; Brisker et al., 2013), the
marginal effect of FTSE_D on MARKET-TO-BOOK is expected to be
positive. Next, we replace I_FIRM with I_FIRMCL and test the statis-
tical signiﬁcance of the relations of LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) with the
ﬁrst lag and the ﬁrst difference of I_FIRMCL (i.e., I FIRMCLt1 and
I FIRMCLDt) and the cross-product of the former with the latter (i.e.,
I FIRMCLt1  I FIRMCLDt). The speciﬁcation for the location premium
dynamic we test is:
LNðMARKET-TO-BOOKÞi;t ¼ f0 þ f1  I FIRMCLi;t1 þ f2  I FIRMCLi;Dt
þ f3  I FIRMCLi;t1  I FIRMCLi;Dt
þ f10  I INCOMEi;t þ f Controlsi;t þ ei;t
ð2Þ
We distinguish the aggregation effect caused by IPOs from the iso-
lation effect caused by delistings. To this end, we introduce two
interacting dummy variables, UP_D and DOWN_D, to detect ﬁrms
that become more or less spatially clustered with other listed ﬁrms
from one year to another (e.g., UP_D = 1 if I FIRMCLDt > 0Þ. When we
run our regressions, we exclude observations for ﬁnancial ﬁrms (SIC
6000–6999). However, these observations are retained for comput-
ing RATIO and I_FIRM.
In the multivariate analysis, we control for (i) equity proﬁtabil-
ity (ROE) (e.g., Bagella et al., 2000), (ii) ﬁrm future growth opportu-
nities (CAPEX-TO-ASSET) (e.g., Chua et al., 2007), (iii) ﬁrm size,
deﬁned by total assets (LN(FIRM SIZE)) (e.g., Van Dijk, 2011), (iv)
ﬁrm age, deﬁned by the number of years of a ﬁrm’s life since foun-
dation (LN(1 + FIRM AGE)) (e.g., Keloharju and Kulp, 1996), (v) ﬁrm
press coverage, deﬁned by the yearly number of newspaper articles
Table 1
Summary statistics.
Mean Median 25th Percentile 75th Percentile
Panel A – all Sample
MARKET-TO-BOOK 2.38 1.70 1.13 2.67
RATIO 0.482 0.515 0.179 0.645
I_FIRM 2.846 2.880 1.559 3.812
I_FIRMCL 2.672 3 1 4
I_INCOME 2.051 2.177 1.881 2.271
FTSE_D 0.10 0 0 0
DEBT-TO-ASSET 24.75% 25.00% 11.83% 36.27%
PRESS COVERAGE 29 13 8 23
FIRM AGE (Years) 40 25 13 58
CAPEX-TO-ASSET 4.99% 3.47% 1.62% 6.10%
R&D–TO-SALES 0.69% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
R&D_D 0.79 1 1 1
ROE 3.28% 6.27% 0.36% 13.04%
FIRM SIZE (Mln €) 3114 363 134 1400
LOCAL GDP(€ per capita) 15,204 15,562 14,068 16,935
Panel B – IPO sample
UNDERPRICING 0.122 0.040 0.013 0.142
I_FIRM 2.501 2.369 1.494 3.372
I_INCOME 1.943 2.032 1.791 2.131
rIPO(30 after) 4.03% 2.45% 1.54% 4.11%
rm(60 before) 0.92% 0.84% 0.67% 1.01%
REVISION 1.291 0.313 0.000 0.667
RANGE 0.237 0.240 0.167 0.308
REPUTATION 0.103 0.031 0.002 0.054
INSTITUTIONAL 0.645 0.649 0.522 0.729
PARTICIPATION RATIO 0.133 0.081 0.000 0.235
DILUTION FACTOR 3.195 0.250 0.111 0.389
PROCEEDS (Mln €) 85.908 88.438 35.047 208.367
FIRM AGE (Years) 17 12 4 20
FIRM SIZE (Mln €) 1519 180 68 436
INDUSTRY MARKET-TO-BOOK 0.70 0.70 0.50 0.90
ROA 4.44% 6.09% 2.12% 10.49%
DEBT-TO-ASSET 30.71% 27.42% 8.60% 46.64%
Panel C – private ﬁrms sample
I_FIRM 2.866 2.455 1.542 3.449
I_INCOME 1.932 2.009 1.755 2.106
INDUSTRY MARKET-TO-BOOK 0.72 0.67 0.48 0.95
ROA 8.45% 7.22% 3.99% 11.91%
DEBT-TO-ASSET 15.45% 11.72% 5.51% 21.35%
This table reports the summary statistics on ﬁrm characteristics. Panel A considers the sample of 1668 observations for Italian nonﬁnancial ﬁrms traded on the MSE over the
period 1999–2007, Panel B uses the subsample of 151 IPOs, and Panel C is on the sample of 61,057 observations for private ﬁrms headquartered in Italy with at least 5 million
in total assets over the period 1999–2007. Financial ﬁrms are SIC 6000–6999. MARKET-TO-BOOK is the ratio of EQUITY MARKET VALUE to EQUITY BOOK VALUE. RATIO is the
ratio of regional EQUITY BOOK VALUE to regional DISPOSABLE INCOME. I_FIRM is the (inverse) dispersion value of listed ﬁrms around the issuing ﬁrm headquarters. I_FIRMCL
takes values in the range 1:4 according to the number of the cluster to which each ﬁrm-year observation belongs so that the higher the cluster value, the higher the within-
cluster average value of I_FIRM. I_INCOME is the (inverse) dispersion value of household income around the issuing ﬁrm headquarters. FTSE_D equals one if the ﬁrm-year
observation is included in the Italian equity market primary index and zero otherwise. DEBT-TO-ASSET is the ratio of total debt to total assets. PRESS COVERAGE is the yearly
number of newspaper articles concerning the corresponding ﬁrm. FIRM AGE is the number of years since the ﬁrm’s foundation. CAPEX-TO-ASSET is the ratio of capital
expenditures to total assets. R&D-TO-SALES is the ratio of R&D to SALES. R&D_D equals one if the ﬁrm does not report R&D and zero otherwise. ROE is the ratio of net proﬁt
income to the EQUITY BOOK VALUE. FIRM SIZE is the value of total asset. LOCAL GDP is the provincial per capita gross domestic product. UNDERPRICING is the percentage
difference between the ﬁrst trading-day market price and the offer price.rIPO(30 after) is the standard deviation of IPO shares’ returns in 30 trading days after the listing.rm(60
before) is the market-index return volatility in 60 trading days before the IPO. REVISION is the percentage the offer price takes with respect to the prospectus indicative price
range. RANGE is the percentage difference between maximum and minimum offer price in the IPO’s prospectus price range. REPUTATION is underwriter’s market share.
INSTITUTIONAL is the ratio of the number of shares offered to institutional investors to the total number of shares in IPO. PARTICIPATION RATIO is the ratio of the number of
secondary shares in IPO to pre-IPO shares outstanding. DILUTION FACTOR is the ratio of the number of primary shares in IPO to pre-IPO shares outstanding. PROCEEDS is IPO
proceeds. INDUSTRY MARKET-TO-BOOK is the median market-to-book ratio of listed ﬁrms in the same industry. ROA is the ratio of EBITDA to total assets.
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AGE)) (e.g., Birz and Lott, 2011), and (vi) ﬁrm leverage (DEBT-TO-
ASSET) (e.g., Arena and Dewally, 2012). In addition, we include in
all regressions (not shown) (vii) a set of four-digit SIC industry
dummies (Chou et al., 2012), (viii) a set of exchange segment list-
ing dummies (Tse and Devos, 2004), and (ix) a set of year dummies.
Finally, to control for further unobservable regional effects when
our regression models include RATIO, we cluster standard errors
at the region level. Otherwise, we control for any possible cross-
sectional and time-series correlation by clustering standard errors
both at the ﬁrm and year level, consistent with Petersen (2009).
When we address the relation between underpricing and ﬁrm
location, the percentage difference between the ﬁrst trading-daymarket price and the offer price (UNDERPRICING) is the left-hand
side variable and I_FIRM and I_INCOME are the main explanatory
variables. We control for (i) the IPO shares volatility (rIPO(30 after))
(e.g., Lowry et al., 2010), (ii) the market volatility before the IPO
(rm
(60 before)
) (e.g., Cassia et al., 2004), (iii and iv) the IPO price revi-
sion (REVISION) (e.g., Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003) and range
(RANGE) (e.g., Hanley, 1993), (v) underwriters reputation
(REPUTATION) (e.g., Megginson and Weiss, 1991), (vi) subscribers
(INSTITUTIONAL) (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2002), (vii–ix) the offer
composition (PARTICIPATION RATIO and DILUITION FACTOR)
(e.g., Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003), and size (LN(1 + PROCEEDS))
(e.g., Cassia et al., 2004), and (x and xi) the ﬁrm age (LN(1 + FIRM
AGE)) and size (LN(FIRM SIZE)) (e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 2004).
Table 2
RATIO and I_FIRM and I_INCOME: the local supply and demand for stocks. Descriptive statistics.
ITALY – MACROAREA – REGION LISTED FIRMS
(Firm-Year Obs.)
NONFINANCIAL LISTED FIRMS
(Firm-Year Obs.)
RATIO I_FIRM I_INCOME
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NUTS0 – COUNTRY
Italy 2463 1668 0.325 2.933 1.851
NUTS1 – MACROAREA
Center (C) 494 349 0.497 1.390 1.616
Islands (I) 20 17 0.013 1.108 1.522
Northeast (NE) 510 401 0.158 2.324 2.199
Northwest (NW) 1400 871 0.595 3.782 2.019
South (S) 39 30 0.003 1.242 1.662
NUTS2 – REGION
Abruzzo S 2 2 0.001 1.344 1.534
Aosta Valley NW 0 0 0.000 0.000 1.816
Apulia S 5 2 0.002 1.209 1.568
Basilicata S 0 0 0.000 0.000 1.630
Calabria S 0 0 0.000 0.000 1.583
Campania S 22 16 0.005 1.228 1.662
Emilia-Romagna NE 281 228 0.144 2.458 2.271
Friuli-Venezia Giulia NE 54 42 0.496 1.463 1.779
Lazio C 300 227 0.920 1.305 1.505
Liguria NW 63 34 0.608 3.014 2.047
Lombardy NW 1033 627 0.559 4.068 2.248
Marche C 44 32 0.045 1.383 1.616
Molise S 10 10 0.037 1.263 1.624
Piedmont NW 304 210 0.691 2.976 2.019
Sardinia I 11 11 0.044 1.093 1.226
Sicily I 9 6 0.002 1.135 1.522
Trentino Alto Adige NE 3 3 0.002 3.231 2.104
Tuscany C 141 90 0.178 1.575 2.017
Umbria C 9 0 0.009 1.356 1.556
Veneto NE 172 128 0.117 2.370 2.199
This table reports the descriptive statistics on the spatial distribution of Italian listed ﬁrms and investor wealth. Statistics are calculated at the following levels: COUNTRY
(NUTS0), MACROAREA (NUTS1), and REGION (NUTS2) (sorted in alphabetical order). Columns 4 to 6 report the yearly average value over the period 1999–2007 of the
corresponding variable. The sample consists of 2463 observations for Italian ﬁrms traded on the MSE over the period 1999–2007. (NONFINANCIAL) LISTED FIRMS is the
number of (nonﬁnancial) ﬁrm-year observations. Financial ﬁrms are SIC 6000–6999. RATIO is the ratio of the aggregate EQUITY BOOK VALUE of listed ﬁrms headquartered in
a given Italian geographical sub-area to the aggregate DISPOSABLE INCOME of households living in the same Italian geographical sub-area. I_FIRM is the (inverse) dispersion
value of listed ﬁrms around the issuing ﬁrm headquarters. I_INCOME is the (inverse) dispersion value of household income around the issuing ﬁrm headquarters. Italy’s sub-
areas have been identiﬁed according to the NUTS Codes.
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which may affect ﬁrms going public (e.g., Chemmanur et al.,
2010). To this end, we use the sample of Italian private ﬁrms with
at least 5 million in total assets (61,057 ﬁrm-year observations)
and test a probit model for the decision to go public (e.g., Pagano
et al., 1998): Each year the dependent variable equals zero if the
ﬁrm stays private and one if it goes public (IPO_D). In addition to
I_FIRM and I_INCOME, we control for (i and ii) ﬁrm age
(LN(1 + FIRM AGE)) and size (LN(FIRM SIZE)) (e.g., Chemmanur
et al., 2010), (iii) IPO timing (INDUSTRY MARKET-TO-BOOK) (e.g.,
Pagano et al., 1998), and (iv and v) ﬁrm proﬁtability (ROA) and
leverage (DEBT-TO-ASSET) (e.g., Pagano et al., 1998). Afterwards,
we augment the UNDERPRICING regression model with the
Heckman’s k, (i.e., the inverse Mills ratio). In econometric models,
standard errors are clustered both by year and sub-sector.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for listed ﬁrms (Panel A),
IPOs (Panel B), and private ﬁrms (Panel C).
Panel A indicates I_FIRM has a higher variability than I_INCOME. In
fact, in terms of the 25th and 75th percentiles, the I_FIRM values are
within the 1.559–3.812 range, while I_INCOME is within the 1.881–
2.271 range. This evidence highlights a mismatch between the spa-
tial distribution of listed ﬁrms and per capita disposable income:
Statistics indicate the copresence of areas densely populated by
listed ﬁrms (e.g., when I_FIRM is equal to 3.812) with areas nearly
devoid of them (e.g., when I_FIRM is equal to 1.559), together with
the simultaneous widespread distribution of investor wealth
(I_INCOME is always approximately 2). Existing local imbalances
between the local demand and local supply for stocks is thenecessary precondition to proﬁtably employ the HKS framework;
in addition, local imbalances ex ante minimize the alleged
correlation between I_FIRM and I_INCOME. Statistics on the other
variables are consistent with prior studies (e.g., Aabo et al., 2013)
and suggest the investigated sample is representative. Finally, Panel
B and Panel C highlight that I_FIRM and I_INCOME are essentially
unchanged both for IPOs and private ﬁrms, indicating that the
spatial distribution for Italian IPOs, listed and private ﬁrms are
similar. Therefore, any possible bias due to unobservable local
features affecting the results should be minimal.
Table A.2 in Appendix A provides detailed deﬁnitions of the
variables here employed.4. The anatomy of I_FIRM and I_INCOME
Table 2 describes the spatial distribution of the local supply and
demand for stocks. Fig. 2 depicts the data: The left-side picture
plots the locations of sampled ﬁrms, and the right-side picture
displays the spatial patterns of RATIO, as well as I_FIRM and
I_INCOME.
With regard to frequencies (cf. column 2 and 3 of Table 2), Ital-
ian listed ﬁrms tend to geographically cluster in only a few areas,
particularly in northern Italy where 77.5% of the whole sample
are headquartered. The Northwest accounts for 56.8% of sampled
ﬁrms, so it is not surprising that the region of Lombardy contains
the most listed ﬁrms, accounting for 1033 ﬁrm-year observations
or 41.9% of the whole data set. The central and southern areas of
Fig. 2. RATIO and I_FIRM and I_INCOME: The regional supply and demand for stocks. This ﬁgure reports: (i) the location of each sampled ﬁrm’s headquarters, distinguishing
nonﬁnancial ﬁrms (the blue-circular data-point) from the ﬁnancial ones (the red-triangular data-point) (left-hand picture) and (ii) the yearly average value over the period
1999–2007 of RATIO, represented by the shading of the corresponding region according to the variable quintiles, and of I_FIRM and I_INCOME, located at the latitude and
longitude of each regional capital town (right-hand picture). The sample consists of 2463 observations for Italian ﬁrms traded on the MSE over the period 1999–2007.
Financial ﬁrms are SIC 6000–6999. RATIO is the ratio of regional EQUITY BOOK VALUE to regional DISPOSABLE INCOME. I_FIRM is the (inverse) dispersion value of listed ﬁrms
around the issuing ﬁrm headquarters. I_INCOME is the (inverse) dispersion value of household income around the issuing ﬁrm headquarters. Italian sub-areas have been
identiﬁed according to NUTS Codes: REGION (NUTS2). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this
article.)
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observations or 22.5% of the whole data set. This area includes Laz-
io (Central Italy including the city of Rome), which alone accounts
for 12.2% of the whole data set.2 Therefore, it follows logically that
the northern regions are generally characterized by RATIO values
above the national mean, and the central and southern areas (includ-
ing the islands) exhibit lower than average values (cf. column 4 of
Table 2). In fact, the Northwest is ﬁrst, averaging 0.595, and the
Center follows with 0.497. On the other hand, in terms of the regio-
nal distribution, the highest value of RATIO is registered in Lazio,
averaging 0.920. Piedmont is second, with an average RATIO of
0.691. At the other extreme, Abruzzo (South) averages 0.001, and
Apulia (South), Sicily (Islands), and Trentino Alto Adige (Northeast)
average 0.002.
The same tendencies, though more pronounced, emerge using
I_FIRM and I_INCOME (cf. column 5 and 6 of Table 2). In fact,
although spatial patterns are substantially unchanged when sum-
marized by RATIO or by I_FIRM and I_INCOME, the values of I_FIRM
and I_INCOME appear more consistent with the actual spatial dis-
tribution of listed ﬁrms and investor wealth. For instance, because
of the ﬁrm clustering in Lombardy, the geographically close regions
of Trentino Alto Adige (average value of I_FIRM equal to 3.231) and
Liguria (3.014) are now second and third, respectively. Similarly,
while Lazio ranks ﬁrst by RATIO, it is in twelfth place by I_FIRM2 This evidence is caused by the clustering of state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
around the Italian capital. Consistent with previous evidence (e.g., Faccio and Lang,
2002), SOEs account for 8.1% of our sample, with an impressive 32.4% headquartered
in Rome.(1.305), which is consistent with the ﬁgures indicating that, apart
from the clustering in Rome, neighboring areas are almost devoid
of listed ﬁrms. Overall, the descriptive statistics conﬁrm that
I_FIRM and I_INCOME are more reﬁned measures of the local
equity market conditions with respect to RATIO.5. The ﬁrm location premium
In this section, we test the signiﬁcance of the relations between
LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) and RATIO as well as I_FIRM and
I_INCOME. We distinguish FTSE-FIRMS from NON-FTSE-FIRMS.
We expect a negative relation between RATIO and MARKET-
TO-BOOK (i.e., b1 < 0). Similarly, while I_FIRM is predicted to
negatively affect MARKET-TO-BOOK, I_INCOME is expected to have
a positive effect (i.e., c1 < 0 and c3 > 0). Finally, we expect
that the MARKET-TO-BOOK of FTSE-FIRMS is less affected by
RATIO, I_FIRM and I_INCOME than the MARKET-TO-BOOK of
NON-FTSE-FIRMS (e.g., c1 + c2 > c1). Table 3 reports the results for
models 1–3, which include RATIO, while models 4–6 use I_FIRM
and I_INCOME.
As expected, the effect of RATIO on LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) is
negative and signiﬁcant (Model 1: b1 = 0.175, p-value < 0.10).
Once controls are introduced, the effect of RATIO is still negative
and signiﬁcant (Model 2: b1 = 0.085, p-value < 0.10). In addition,
while the relation between RATIO and LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK)
remains negative and statistically signiﬁcant for NON-FTSE-FIRMS
(Model 3: b1 = 0.125, p-value < 0.05), it is no longer signiﬁcant for
FTSE-FIRMS as predicted (Model 3: b1 + b2 = 0.160, p-value > 0.10).
Finally, all control variables have the predicted pattern.
Table 3
The effect of RATIO and I_FIRM and I_INCOME on MARKET-TO-BOOK.
Independent variables Dependent variable: LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK)
RATIO I_FIRM & I_INCOME
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.518*** 1.057*** 1.394*** 0.048 0.553** 0.845**
(3.67) (5.01) (5.24) (0.20) (2.28) (2.89)
RATIO b1 0.175* 0.085* 0.125**
(1.93) (1.82) (2.59)
RATIO*FTSE_D b2 0.285***
(3.70)
I_FIRM c1 0.078*** 0.063** 0.068***
(3.03) (2.78) (2.98)
I_FIRM*FTSE_D c2 0.046
(0.21)
I_INCOME c3 0.290*** 0.263*** 0.292***
(3.45) (4.33) (4.51)
I_INCOME*FTSE_D c4 0.282
(0.37)
FTSE_D bFTSE, cFTSE 0.159 0.756
(1.35) (0.81)
DEBT-TO-ASSET 0.202 0.250 0.179 0.237
(0.98) (1.21) (0.87) (1.12)
LN(1 + PRESS COVERAGE) 0.277*** 0.246*** 0.277*** 0.246***
(6.56) (6.34) (6.64) (6.42)
LN(1 + FIRM AGE) 0.120* 0.132** 0.118* 0.131**
(2.06) (2.53) (2.00) (2.65)
CAPEX-TO-ASSET 0.069 0.062 0.047 0.027
(0.29) (0.26) (0.19) (0.11)
ROE 0.416*** 0.407*** 0.402*** 0.396**
(3.18) (3.03) (3.06) (2.90)
LN(FIRM SIZE) 0.067** 0.087*** 0.060** 0.081**
(2.40) (2.96) (2.21) (2.85)
Observations 1460 1410 1410 1460 1410 1410
Adjusted R-squared 0.36 0.47 0.48 0.36 0.47 0.48
This table reports the results of the multivariate analysis of relations between LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) and RATIO in addition to I_FIRM and I_INCOME. The sample consists of
1668 observations for Italian nonﬁnancial ﬁrms traded on the MSE over the period 1999–2007. Financial ﬁrms are SIC 6000–6999. RATIO is the ratio of regional EQUITY BOOK
VALUE to regional DISPOSABLE INCOME. I_FIRM is the (inverse) dispersion value of listed ﬁrms around the issuing ﬁrm headquarters. I_INCOME is the (inverse) dispersion
value of household income around the issuing ﬁrm headquarters. FTSE_D equals one if the ﬁrm is included in the Italian equity market primary index and zero otherwise.
DEBT-TO-ASSET is the ratio of total debt to total assets. PRESS COVERAGE is the yearly number of newspaper articles concerning the corresponding ﬁrm. FIRM AGE is the
number of years since the ﬁrm’s foundation. CAPEX-TO-ASSET is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. ROE is the ratio of net proﬁt income to the EQUITY BOOK
VALUE. FIRM SIZE is the value of total assets. Also included in regressions (but not shown) are a set of four-digit SIC industry dummies, dummies for segment listing, and year
dummies. Italian sub-areas have been identiﬁed according to NUTS Codes: REGION (NUTS2). In Models 1–3: t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by REGION are
reported in parentheses. In Models 4–6: t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by ﬁrm and year are reported in parentheses.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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inferred by considering the average sampled NON-FTSE-FIRMS
for which the MARKET-TO-BOOK is 2.24 and RATIO equals 0.463.
Our results imply that, ceteris paribus, 42.13% of MARKET-TO-BOOK
is attributable to RATIO: When RATIO goes from the 25th to 75th
percentile (i.e., from 0.160 to 0.645), the percentage change in
the MARKET-TO-BOOK equals 5.88% due to the decrease in the
location premium.
The evidence from I_FIRM and I_INCOME is similar. Indeed,
both I_FIRM and I_INCOME are signiﬁcantly related with LN(MAR-
KET-TO-BOOK). As expected, while the relation of LN(MARKET-
TO-BOOK) with I_FIRM is negative (Model 4: c1 = 0.078,
p-value < 0.01), the relation of LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) with
I_INCOME is positive (Model 4: c3 = 0.290, p-value < 0.01). Once
control variables are included, the pattern remains unchanged
(Model 5: c1 = 0.063, p-value < 0.05; c3 = 0.263, p-value < 0.01).
Furthermore, when FTSE-FIRMS and NON-FTSE-FIRMS are investi-
gated, I_FIRM and I_INCOME are still negatively and positively
related, respectively, with LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) (Model 6:
c1 = 0.068, p-value < 0.01; c3 = 0.292, p-value < 0.01). At the same
time, as predicted, the effects of I_FIRM and I_INCOME on
LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) are not signiﬁcant when only FTSE-FIRMSare considered (Model 6: c1 + c2 = 0.022, p-value > 0.10;
c3 + c4 = 0.010, p-value > 0.10). Finally, the pattern of the control
variables is as expected and unchanged.
Economically, consider once more the average sampled NON-
FTSE-FIRMS, for which I_FIRM is 2.828 and I_INCOME is 2.067.
Our ﬁndings imply that, ceteris paribus, 36.83% of MARKET-TO-
BOOK is attributable to I_FIRM. In fact, 0.192 (0.192 = 0.068
x 2.828) is the estimated LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) attributable to
I_FIRM, and 0.825 (0.825 = e(0.192)) is the corresponding estimated
MARKET-TO-BOOK, which is 36.83% (0.3683 = 0.825/2.24) of MAR-
KET-TO-BOOK. On the other hand, I_INCOME is found to have a
weight of 81.64%, implying it affects MARKET-TO-BOOK 2.22 times
(2.22 = 0.8164/0.3683) stronger than I_FIRM. Overall, 67.35% of
MARKET-TO-BOOK is due to the joint effect of I_FIRM and
I_INCOME. From a more dynamic perspective, when I_FIRM goes
from the 25th to 75th percentile (from 1.630 to 3.811), the varia-
tion in the MARKET-TO-BOOK is equal to 13.78%. On the other
hand, because investor wealth is more homogeneously distributed
than listed ﬁrms, the same variation for I_INCOME (from 1.899 to
2.283) implies a positive (lower) percentage change in the
MARKET-TO-BOOK, which is equal to 11.85%. When both I_FIRM
and I_INCOME vary from the 25th to the 75th percentiles, the
Table 4
The effect of variations of I_FIRMCL on MARKET-TO-BOOK.
Independent variables Dependent variable: LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK)
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.768
(1.73)
I_FIRMCL d4 0.055**
(2.80)
I FIRMCLt1 f1 0.054
** 0.063***
(2.39) (3.01)
I FIRMCLDt f2 0.037
(0.92)
I FIRMCLt1  I FIRMCLDt f3 0.001
(0.03)
I FIRMCLt1  UP D f4 1.690
***
(7.98)
I FIRMCLDt  UP D f5 1.693
***
(6.43)
I FIRMCLt1  I FIRMCLDt  UP D f6 1.618
***
(7.25)
UP_D fUP 1.602***
(6.43)
I FIRMCLt1  DOWN D f7 0.482
**
(2.93)
I FIRMCLDt  DOWN D f8 1.618
***
(3.87)
I FIRMCLt1  I FIRMCLDt  DOWN D f9 0.430
***
(3.36)
DOWN_D fDOWN 1.599***
(3.40)
I_INCOME d11, f11 0.257*** 0.271*** 0.311***
(3.67) (3.29) (3.53)
DEBT-TO-ASSET 0.247 0.211 0.200
(1.30) (0.95) (0.94)
LN(1 + PRESS COVERAGE) 0.272*** 0.280*** 0.280***
(7.07) (7.12) (7.03)
LN(1 + FIRM AGE) 0.099 0.111* 0.108
(1.63) (1.81) (1.74)
CAPEX-TO-ASSET 0.102 0.368 0.389
(0.30) (0.93) (1.02)
ROE 0.346** 0.331** 0.361**
(2.19) (2.47) (2.53)
LN(FIRM SIZE) 0.088** 0.090** 0.086**
(2.77) (2.57) (2.42)
Observations 1268 1068 1068
Adjusted R-squared 0.44 0.43 0.43
This table reports the results of the multivariate analysis of relations between LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) and variations of I_FIRMCL. The sample consists of 1489 observations for
Italian nonﬁnancial ﬁrms traded on the MSE over the period 1999–2007, not in the FTSE MIB. Financial ﬁrms are SIC 6000–6999. I_FIRMCL takes values in the range 1:4
according to the number of the cluster to which each ﬁrm-year observation belongs so that the higher the cluster value, the higher the within-cluster average value of I_FIRM.
I FIRMCLt1 is the ﬁrst lag of I_FIRM
CL. I FIRMCLDt is the ﬁrst difference of I_FIRM
CL. UP_D equals one if I FIRMCLDt is greater than zero and zero otherwise. DOWN_D equals one if
I FIRMCLDt is lower than zero and zero otherwise. I_FIRM is the (inverse) dispersion value of listed ﬁrms around the issuing ﬁrm headquarters. I_INCOME is the (inverse)
dispersion value of household income around the issuing ﬁrm headquarters. DEBT-TO-ASSET is the ratio of total debt to total assets. PRESS COVERAGE is the yearly number of
newspaper articles concerning the corresponding ﬁrm. FIRM AGE is the number of years since the ﬁrm’s foundation. CAPEX-TO-ASSET is the ratio of capital expenditures to
total assets. ROE is the ratio of net proﬁt income to the EQUITY BOOK VALUE. FIRM SIZE is the value of total assets. Also included in regressions (but not shown) are a set of
four-digit SIC industry dummies, dummies for segment listing, and year dummies. The t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by ﬁrm and year are reported in
parentheses.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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(decrease in the) LHB effect with the (increase in the) local investor
risk tolerance.
6. Local IPOs, local delistings and the dynamic of the ﬁrm
location premium
In this section, we test the signiﬁcance of the relation between
LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) and the variations of the LHB. The variable
I_FIRMCL deﬁnes the ﬁrm local clustering and proxies the LHB. We
jointly test the signiﬁcance of the relations of LN(MARKET-TO-
BOOK) with I FIRMCLt1, I FIRM
CL
Dt , and I FIRM
CL
t1  I FIRMCLDt . We
distinguish the aggregation effect caused by IPOs (UP_D) fromthe isolation effect of delistings (DOWN_D). A negative relation is
expected between I FIRMCLt1 and MARKET-TO-BOOK (i.e., f1 < 0).
On the other hand, while I FIRMCLDt and I FIRM
CL
t1  I FIRMCLDt are pre-
dicted to be negatively and positively related with MARKET-TO-
BOOK when the effect of local IPOs is considered (i.e., f5 < 0 and
f6 > 0), the opposite pattern is predicted for local delistings (i.e.,
f8 > 0 and f9 < 0). Table 4 reports the results. Model 1 is the base
speciﬁcation: It mimics Model 5 of Table 3 after I_FIRM has been
replaced with I_FIRMCL. In Model 2, variations of I_FIRMCL are
addressed, while Model 3 distinguishes between the effects of local
IPOs and delistings.
The effect of I_FIRMCL on LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) is negative and
signiﬁcant as expected (Model 1: d4 = 0.055, p-value < 0.05). Most
Table 5
The effect of I_FIRM and I_INCOME on UNDERPRICING.
Independent variables Dependent variable
UNDERPRICING UNDERPRICING IPO_D IPO_D UNDERPRICING
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 0.290 0.432** 4.768*** 5.936*** 0.447**
(1.09) (2.38) (15.54) (8.89) (2.18)
I_FIRM c1 0.025** 0.0001* 0.027***
(2.46) (1.79) (3.30)
I_INCOME c3 0.096** 0.0005** 0.131**
(2.41) (1.99) (2.11)
rIPO(30 after) 4.834*** 4.809*** 4.851***
(8.03) (8.86) (7.58)
rm(60 before) 2.342 2.717 0.967
(0.58) (0.60) (0.21)
REVISION 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.36) (1.33) (1.22)
RANGE 0.092 0.088 0.122
(0.79) (0.76) (0.89)
REPUTATION 0.034 0.009 0.012
(0.47) (0.13) (0.14)
INSTITUTIONAL 0.077 0.076** 0.065*
(1.57) (2.10) (1.95)
PARTICIPATION RATIO 0.080 0.089 0.094
(1.13) (1.50) (1.52)
DILUTION FACTOR 0.151*** 0.152*** 0.152***
(3.01) (2.73) (2.67)
LN(1 + PROCEEDS) 0.013 0.009 0.007
(0.61) (0.37) (0.28)
LN(1 + FIRM AGE) 0.005 0.005 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.005
(0.38) (0.48) (-5.14) (-5.47) (0.29)
LN(FIRM SIZE) 0.023 0.023 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.010
(1.16) (1.15) (10.66) (11.53) (0.56)
INDUSTRY MARKET-TO-BOOK 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(5.92) (5.11)
ROA 0.0001 0.0001
(0.50) (0.57)
DEBT-TO-ASSET 0.001*** 0.001***
(5.86) (5.32)
k k 0.004
(0.19)
Observations 137 137 60,002 60,002 137
Adjusted R-squared (Pseudo R-squared) 0.69 0.70 (0.24) (0.23) 0.71
F-test (v2-test) 9.782*** 8.647*** (720.7***) (739.9***) 8.250***
This table reports the results of the multivariate analysis of relations between UNDERPRICING and I_FIRM and I_INCOME. The sample consists of 151 observations for Italian
IPOs and 61,057 observations for private ﬁrms headquartered in Italy with at least 5 million in total assets over the period 1999–2007. UNDERPRICING is the percentage
difference between the ﬁrst trading-day market price and the offer price. IPO_D equals zero if the ﬁrm stays private and one if it goes public. I_FIRM is the (inverse) dispersion
value of listed ﬁrms around the issuing ﬁrm headquarters. I_INCOME is the (inverse) dispersion value of household income around the issuing ﬁrm headquarters.rIPO(30 after)
is the standard deviation of IPO shares’ returns in 30 trading days after the listing. rm(60 before) is the market-index return volatility in 60 trading days before the IPO.
REVISION is the percentage the offer price takes with respect to the prospectus indicative price range. RANGE is the percentage difference between maximum and minimum
offer price in the IPO’s prospectus price range. REPUTATION is underwriter’s market share. INSTITUTIONAL is the ratio of the number of shares offered to institutional
investors to the total number of shares in IPO. PARTICIPATION RATIO is the ratio of the number of secondary shares in IPO to pre-IPO shares outstanding. DILUTION FACTOR is
the ratio of the number of primary shares in IPO to pre-IPO shares outstanding. PROCEEDS is IPO proceeds. FIRM AGE is the number of years since the ﬁrm’s foundation. FIRM
SIZE is the value of total assets (lagged in Models 3 and 4). INDUSTRY MARKET-TO-BOOK is the median market-to-book ratio of listed ﬁrms in the same industry. ROA is the
(lagged) ratio of EBITDA to total assets. DEBT-TO-ASSET is the ratio of total debt to total assets (lagged in Models 3 and 4). k is the inverse of the Mills’ ratio used to correct for
self-selection bias (Heckman, 1979). The t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by year and sub-sector are reported in parentheses.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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effect of I_FIRM on LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) (v2-test = 0.94,
p-value = 0.33). Furthermore, the pattern of the control variables
is as expected and unchanged. Overall, this evidence strongly
supports the consistency of I_FIRMCL.
When variations of I_FIRMCL are addressed, the relation
between I FIRMCLt1 and LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) is negative and sig-
niﬁcant (Model 2: f1 = 0.054, p-value < 0.05) as predicted. On the
other hand, the relations of I FIRMCLDt and I FIRM
CL
t1  I FIRMCLDt with
LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) are not statistically signiﬁcant (Model 2:
f2 = 0.037, p-value > 0.10; f3 = 0.001, p-value > 0.10). If they
are signiﬁcant when singularly addressed, this implies that theaggregation effect of IPOs on average counterbalances the isolation
effect of delistings.
When the effects of local IPOs and local delistings are disentan-
gled, the ﬁndings are as expected (cf. Model 3). Indeed, the
LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) of ﬁrms that are clustering because of local
IPOs (UP_D = 1) decreases with I FIRMCLt1 (i.e., the former level of
local clustering) and I FIRMCLDt (i.e., the increase of local clustering
caused by local IPOs); in addition, LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK)
increases with I FIRMCLt1  I FIRMCLDt , meaning that the higher the
level of clustering, the lower is the value-decreasing effect of the
local IPOs (Model 3: f4 = 1.690, p-value < 0.01; f5 = 1.693,
p-value < 0.01; f6 = 1.618, p-value < 0.01). Interestingly, UP_D is
Table 6
Robustness check.
Independent variables Dependent variable: LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK)
R&D-TO-SALES NORTHEAST NORTHWEST SOUTH & CENTER LOCAL GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 0.834** 1.316 0.323 2.276** 0.950
(2.37) (1.45) (0.70) (2.42) (1.60)
I_FIRM c1 0.077*** 0.235** 0.140** 0.402* 0.072**
(3.21) (2.23) (11.99) (1.67) (2.84)
I_INCOME c3 0.272*** 1.543*** 0.388* 0.562* 0.306***
(3.62) (3.89) (1.69) (1.74) (3.67)
DEBT-TO-ASSET 0.276 0.587* 0.008 0.368 0.296
(1.38) (1.91) (0.04) (1.11) (1.50)
LN(1 + PRESS COVERAGE) 0.280*** 0.430*** 0.195*** 0.215*** 0.276***
(7.04) (6.93) (6.42) (3.59) (7.98)
LN(1 + FIRM AGE) 0.097 0.017 0.116*** 0.148*** 0.092
(1.56) (0.29) (3.66) (2.65) (1.54)
CAPEX-TO-ASSET 0.053 0.400 0.050 0.324
(0.09) (1.15) (0.10) (1.27)
R&D-TO-SALES 1.295**
(2.37)
ROE 0.362** 0.136 0.534*** 0.131 0.348**
(2.36) (0.48) (3.46) (0.82) (2.22)
LN(FIRM SIZE) 0.095*** 0.169*** 0.033 0.153*** 0.080**
(3.06) (3.97) (1.21) (2.89) (2.40)
LN(1 + LOCAL GDP) 10.308
(0.35)
Observations 1306 319 747 295 1148
Adjusted R-squared 0.45 0.54 0.54 0.62 0.46
This table reports the results of the multivariate analysis of relations between LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) and I_FIRM and I_INCOME. The sample consists of 1489 observations for
Italian nonﬁnancial ﬁrms traded on the MSE over the period 1999–2007, not in the FTSE MIB. Financial ﬁrms are SIC 6000–6999. Model 1 and Model 5 use the overall sample.
Models 2, 3 and 4 are for the subsamples of ﬁrms headquartered in the macroareas (NUTS1) of Northeast (NE), Northwest (NW) and South and Central Italy (C, S, I),
respectively. I_FIRM is the (inverse) dispersion value of listed ﬁrms around the issuing ﬁrm headquarters. I_INCOME is the (inverse) dispersion value of household income
around the issuing ﬁrm headquarters. DEBT-TO-ASSET is the ratio of total debt to total assets. PRESS COVERAGE is the yearly number of newspaper articles concerning the
corresponding ﬁrm. FIRM AGE is the number of years since the ﬁrm’s foundation. CAPEX-TO-ASSET is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. R&D-TO-SALES is the
ratio of R&D to SALES. ROE is the ratio of net proﬁt income to the EQUITY BOOK VALUE. FIRM SIZE is the value of total assets. LOCAL GDP is the provincial per capita gross
domestic product. Also included in regressions (but not shown) are a set of four-digit SIC industry dummies, dummies for segment listing, and year dummies. In Model 1 is
included also a dummy variable that equals one if the ﬁrm does not report R&D (R&D_D). Italy’s sub-areas have been identiﬁed according to NUTS Codes. The t-statistics based
on standard errors clustered by ﬁrm and year are reported in parentheses.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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(Model 3: fUP = 1.602, p-value < 0.01), meaning that, all other
things being equal, ﬁrms facing local IPOs trade at a premium.
Consistently, the pattern is specular when the effect of local delis-
tings (DOWN_D = 1) is addressed. The relations of I FIRMCLt1,
I FIRMCLDt , and I FIRM
CL
t1  I FIRMCLDt with LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK)
are negative, positive, and negative, respectively (Model 3:
f7 = 0.482, p-value < 0.05; f8 = 1.618, p-value < 0.01; f9 = 0.430,
p-value < 0.01), meaning that for ﬁrms that are becoming more
isolated due to local delistings, the market value decreases with
the initial level of local clustering and increases with a decreasing
number of local listed ﬁrms remaining after the local delistings.
Furthermore, the value-enhancing effect of local delistings
weakens the higher the former level of local clustering. Finally,
DOWN_D is also positively and signiﬁcantly related with
LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) (Model 3: fDOWN = 1.599, p-value < 0.01),
meaning that, all other things being equal, ﬁrms facing local
delistings also trade at a premium.
Economically, now consider the isolated ﬁrms for which
I_FIRMCL equals 1. In addition, suppose that because of local IPOs,
the value of I_FIRMCL rises to 2 (i.e., I FIRMCLt1 = 1, I FIRM
CL
Dt = 1
and UP_D = 1). Our results imply a negative variation of the LHB
effect and thus of the location premium, which is equal to
7.23%. Notably, the estimated variation in LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK)
is 0.075 (0.075 = 1.693  (2–1) + 1.618  (2–1)  1), which
corresponds to a variation of MARKET-TO-BOOK of 7.23%
(0.0723 = e(0.075)  1). However, if due to more intense localIPO activity the same isolated ﬁrm clusters up to values of I_FIRMCL
of 3 or 4, the MARKET-TO-BOOK variations are estimated to equal
13.93% and 20.15%, respectively. Similarly, the clustered ﬁrm
(i.e., I_FIRMCL = 4) that is becoming more isolated because of local
delistings experiences positive variations in the LHB effect and ulti-
mately of the location premium, which are estimated at 35.80%,
22.63%, and 10.74% if the prospective level of clustering is equal
to 1, 2, and 3, respectively.7. Local clustering and IPO underpricing
In this section, we test the signiﬁcance of the relation between
UNDERPRICING and I_FIRM and I_INCOME. We predict I_FIRM neg-
atively affects UNDERPRICING, while I_INCOME is expected to pos-
itively affect UNDERPRICING (i.e., c1 < 0 and c3 > 0). Table 5 reports
the results. Model 1 is the baseline speciﬁcation for UNDERPRIC-
ING. Model 2 adds I_FIRM and I_INCOME. Model 3 and 4 test the
likelihood of going public. Finally, Model 5 tests the UNDERPRIC-
ING controlling for self-selection bias.
As predicted, UNDERPRICING is negatively affected by I_FIRM
(Model 2: c1 = 0.025, p-value < 0.05) and positively affected by
I_INCOME (Model 2: c3 = 0.096, p-value < 0.05). In addition, the
pattern of the control variables is as expected. Model 3 and 4 test
the listing decision: In particular, Model 4 shows the likelihood of
going public is negatively related to I_FIRM (Model 4: c1 = 0.0001,
p-value < 0.10) and positively related to I_INCOME (Model 4:
Table A.1
Data sources.
Data source Url Data collected
Household level
ISTAT www.istat.it Household disposable income and resident population at region level
Rapporto Unioncamere www.unioncamere.it Household disposable income and resident population at province level
Firm level
Consob www.consob.it List of all ﬁrms issuing securities listed on the MSE over the period 1999–2007
Osiris https://osiris.bvdep.com Location (Address, City, Province, ZIP code) of the headquarters of each sampled ﬁrm
Company Annual Report www.borsaitaliana.it & company website Location (Address, City, Province, ZIP code) of the headquarters of each sampled ﬁrm
Borsa Italiana S.p.A. www.borsaitaliana.it List updated at the end of the last working day of each year over the period 1999–2007
of: (i) securities not actively traded on the MSE and (ii) securities traded on the MSE
included in the FTSE MIB Index; IPO prospectus and data
Amadeus https://amadeus.bvdinfo.com List of all private ﬁrms headquartered in Italy and private ﬁrms data
Il Sole 24 Ore www.ilsole24ore.com Firm press coverage: number of articles
Il Calepino dell’Azionista www.mbres.it/it/publications/
calepino-dellazionista
Year of ﬁrm foundation
Datastream & Worldscope www.thomsonone.com Financial and accounting information
Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu NUTS Codes
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even affect the decision to go public.
Our results on UNDERPRICING are conﬁrmed even controlling
for self-selection bias.3 When Heckman’s k is included among the
explanatory variables, the effect of I_FIRM on UNDERPRICING
remains negative and highly statistically signiﬁcant (Model 5:
c1 = 0.027, p-value < 0.01), while the effect of I_INCOME on
UNDERPRICING is positive and signiﬁcant (Model 5: c3 = 0.131,
p-value < 0.05). Overall this evidence suggests that even though
location speciﬁc factors drive the listing decision, the LHB effect is
(at least partly) underestimated in the IPO price-setting process as
IPOs located in areas with higher income clustering and lower
concentration of local listed ﬁrms exhibit larger underpricing.
From an economic point of view, when I_FIRM goes from the
25th to 75th percentile (from 1.630 to 3.811), our results indicate
a negative variation of the LHB effect and a variation in the
UNDERPRICING equal to 5.89%. On the other hand, same varia-
tion for I_INCOME (from 1.899 to 2.283) results in a positive
change in UNDERPRICING equal to 5.02%.8. Robustness checks
In this section, we provide the results from a series of additional
robustness checks. Table 6 displays the results.
In Model 1, we replicate the analysis of Table 3 using as a proxy
for growth opportunities R&D-TO-SALES as in HKS instead of
CAPEX-TO-ASSET. Although not shown, we also include a dummy
variable (R&D_D) that equals one if the company does not report
R&D expenditure (R&D) and zero otherwise (e.g., Chan et al.,
2001; HKS). Findings are unchanged with respect to previous
results.
Socioeconomic characteristics in Italy vary drastically by
geographical areas. For instance, per capita GDP and the level of
unemployment are sharply different between northern and south-
ern Italy (e.g., Guiso et al., 2004). These differences likely have a
signiﬁcant effect on MARKET-TO-BOOK and ﬁrm and investor
income clustering. To control for local socioeconomic characteris-
tics, we replicate the analysis of Table 3 on the subsamples of ﬁrms
headquartered in the macroareas of Northeast (Model 2),
Northwest (Model 3), and South and Central Italy (Model 4). In
Model 5, as a further check, we also replicate the analysis of Table 33 Results are based on outcomes of Model 4. However, ﬁndings are unchanged
when based on Model 3 (not reported).by introducing the control variable for provincial per capita GDP
(LOCAL GDP). Once again, the main ﬁndings are unchanged.9. Conclusions
The notion that geographic traits affect ﬁrm value is well estab-
lished in the economics, ﬁnance, and management literature. How-
ever, only peripheral empirical evidence about causation has been
produced so far. Borrowing a measure (used in ecology) to synthe-
size the attributes of ﬁrm geographic location, this paper provides
evidence of a ﬁrm location premium that is dynamically affected
by local IPOs and delistings.
We estimate that listed ﬁrms beneﬁt from a location premium
that is approximately 0.7 of their market-to-book and increases
with the Local Home Bias (LHB) and local investor risk tolerance.
More broadly, the corporate market value increases with the dis-
tance of any given ﬁrm to other listed ﬁrms and increases almost
twofold in proximity to high investor income. Remarkably, we ﬁnd
that local IPOs and delistings consistently affect the market value
of listed ﬁrms. For instance, we estimate that the location premium
of highly isolated (clustered) ﬁrms decreases (increases) by as
much as 20% (35%) because of the aggregation (isolation) effect
of local IPOs (delistings). In the same vein, we ﬁnd IPO underpric-
ing also drops with ﬁrm proximity to other listed ﬁrms and
increases in proximity to investor income: the ﬁrst-day return of
clustered IPOs is, on average, 6% lower than the ﬁrst-day return
of the isolated IPOs.
Our ﬁndings also furnish new evidence that arguably represents
a call for future research. For instance, ﬁrms facing signiﬁcant local
IPOs or delisting activity trade at a premium. This evidence seems
consistent with a sort of value-enhancing-environment effect. Con-
ceivably, while IPOs are in developing areas with conditions favor-
ing economic growth (e.g., high-quality infrastructure, access to a
deeper and higher quality labor pool, etc.), delistings are in disin-
vesting areas that have met the same positive conditions so far.
All other things being equal, ﬁrms beneﬁtting from valuable envi-
ronmental conditions, trade at a premium.
The ﬁnancial research is enriched by the introduction of mea-
sures of ﬁrm exposure to LHB and investor risk tolerance, and
the empirical ﬁndings add to the asset-pricing, IPOs, and going pri-
vate transactions literature. Finally, ﬁrms can be equated to living
organisms in their grueling attempt to successfully interact with
each other and with the environment they live into survive, so it
follows that measurement instruments used in the ﬁeld of ecology
become useful tools for future contributions in ﬁnancial research.
Table A.2
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variable Description
rIPO(30 after) The standard deviation of IPO shares’ returns in 30 trading days after the listing. Source: Datastream (datatype: RI)
rm(60 before) The market-index return volatility in 60 trading days before the IPO. Source: Datastream (datatype: RI)
k Inverse of the Mills’ ratio used to correct for self-selection bias (Heckman, 1979).
CAPEX-TO-ASSET The ratio of capital expenditures (Worldscope datatype: WC04601) to total assets (Worldscope datatype: WC02999).
DEBT-TO-ASSET The ratio of total debt (Worldscope datatype: WC03255) to total assets (Worldscope datatype: WC02999).
DILUTION FACTOR The ratio of the number of primary shares in IPO to pre-IPO shares outstanding. Source: Borsa Italiana
DISPOSABLE INCOME The household disposable income
It is computed as follows:
DISPOSABLE INCOME = Primary Income  Current Taxes  Social Contributions + Social Beneﬁts + Other Net Transfers
where:
Primary Income = Gross Operating Surplus + Gross Mixed Income + Income from Employment + Financial Income (Equity
Income + Non-Equity Income).
Source: ISTAT
DISTANCE The shortest spherical distance between two points on the Earth’s surface in kilometers.
Formally, let (hs, ks) and (hf, kf) be the geographical latitude and longitude of two points, a base standpoint S and the destination fore
point F, respectively. The DISTANCE ds,f between S and F is computed as:
ds,f = arc cos {cos(lons  lonf)*cos(lats)*cos(latf) + sin(lats)*sin(latf)}*2pr/360
where:
r is the radius of the earth (6378 km)
DOWN_D Equal to one if I FIRMCLDt is lower than zero and zero otherwise
EQUITY BOOK VALUE Book value of common equity. Source: Worldscope (datatype: WC03501)
EQUITY MARKET VALUE Market value of common equity. Source: Worldscope (datatype: WC08001).
FIRM AGE The number of years of a ﬁrm’s life since foundation. Source: Il Calepino dell’Azionista.
FIRM SIZE Total assets. Source: Worldscope (datatype: WC02999).
FTSE_D Equal to one if the ﬁrm is included in the Italian equity market primary index (FTSE MIB Index) and zero otherwise. Source: Borsa
Italiana.
(NON-)FTSE-FIRMS Firm-year observations for which FTSE_D is (not) equal to one.
I The Johnson and Zimmer index of dispersion.
Formally, given the two-dimensional Euclidean space E2, let the generic point i and a sample of r random points in E2, all
individuated by the latitude and longitude geographical coordinates, the Johnson and Zimmer dispersion index I for the point i is
computed as:
I ¼ ðrþ1Þ
Pr
r¼1&r–iðd
4
i;r ÞPr
r¼1&r–iðd
2
i;r Þ
 2
where:
di,r is the DISTANCE between the point i and each of the r-points.
The expected value of I has a value approaching two for a random distribution, lower than two for scattered distribution, and higher
than two for an aggregated distribution.
In the weighted version of I, di,r in the numerator has to be multiplied by wi,r2 , while di,r in the denominator is multiplied by wi,r,
where: wi,r is the weight of di,r
I_FIRM The yearly Johnson and Zimmer dispersion index computed on the geographical locations (i.e., latitude and longitude) of the issuing
ﬁrm headquarters and the headquarters of all other sampled listed ﬁrms
I_FIRMCL The four-clustered-based version of the I_FIRM variable (i.e., I_FIRMCL4). It takes values in the range 1:4, which deﬁnes the number
of clusters to which each ﬁrm-year observation belongs; the higher the cluster value is, the higher the within-cluster average value
of I_FIRM
I FIRMCLDt The ﬁrst difference of I_FIRM
CL
I FIRMCLt1 The ﬁrst lag of I_FIRM
CL
I_FIRMCLN The set of our 10 clustered versions of the I_FIRM variable, depending on the number of clusters in which observations are grouped.
I_FIRMCLN variables have been obtained by matching over YEAR for each value of N I FIRMCLN

YEAR variables. The generic clustered
version of the I_FIRM variable, I_FIRMCLN, is deﬁned for all sampled ﬁrm-year observations, takes values in the range 1:N, and
deﬁnes the number of the clusters to which each ﬁrm-year observation belongs. Clusters are ranked in ascending order according to
the average value within-cluster of I_FIRM
I FIRMCLN

YEAR The set of 90 variables obtained from I FIRM
CLN
YEAR variables. For each of the I FIRM
CLN
YEAR variables: (i) the clusters have been ranked in
ascending order according to the within-cluster average value of I_FIRM; (ii) the clusters have been consistently re-coded
I FIRMCLNYEAR The set of 90 variables obtained from clustering the year-by-year sampled ﬁrm-year observations on the basis of the value of the
I_FIRM variable, using (i) hierarchical clustering, (ii) the average clustering linkage method, and (iii) the absolute-value distance (the
Minkowski distance metric with argument one) as a (dis)similarity measure
The generic I FIRMCLNYEAR variable is deﬁned only in the respective YEAR and assumes values in the range 1: N,
where:
YEAR = 1999, 2000, . . ., 2007, and N = 1, 2, . . ., 10 is the number of clusters in which ﬁrm-year observations have been grouped
I_INCOME The yearly weighted Johnson and Zimmer dispersion index computed on geographical locations (i.e., latitude and longitude) of the
issuing ﬁrm headquarters and all provincial capital cities, with weights equal to the normalized provincial per capita DISPOSABLE
INCOME
(continued on next page)
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Table A.2 (continued)
Variable Description
INDUSTRY MARKET-TO-BOOK The median market-to-book ratio of listed ﬁrms in the same industry. Source: Amadeus
INSTITUTIONAL The ratio of the number of shares offered to institutional investors to the total number of shares in IPO. Source: Borsa Italiana
IPO_D Equal to zero if the ﬁrm stays private and one if it goes public. Source: Amadeus
LOCAL GDP The provincial per capita gross domestic product. Source: ISTAT
MARKET-TO-BOOK The ratio of EQUITY MARKET VALUE to EQUITY BOOK VALUE
PARTICIPATION RATIO The ratio of the number of secondary shares in IPO to pre-IPO shares outstanding. Source: Borsa Italiana
PRESS COVERAGE The yearly number of newspaper articles concerning the corresponding ﬁrm. Source: Il Sole 24 Ore
PROCEEDS IPO proceeds. Source: Borsa Italiana
RANGE The percentage difference between maximum and minimum offer price in the IPO’s prospectus price range. Source: Borsa Italiana
RATIO The ratio of the EQUITY BOOK VALUE of all listed ﬁrms headquartered in a given geographical area to the DISPOSABLE INCOME of all
households living in the same geographical area
Formally, considering at year t an economy where I listed ﬁrms and k households are located in the region j, the RATIO for region j is
computed as:
RATIOj;t ¼
P
i
BVi;j;tP
k
DIk;j;t
where:
BVi,j,t is the EQUITY BOOK VALUE of the listed ﬁrm i headquartered in the region j in the year t, and DIk,j is the DISPOSABLE INCOME of
the household k living in the region j in the year t
REPUTATION Underwriter’s market share. Source: Borsa Italiana
REVISION The percentage the offer price takes with respect to the prospectus indicative price range. Source: Borsa Italiana
R&D Research and development expense. Source: Worldscope (datatype: WC01201)
R&D_D Equal to one if the ﬁrm does not report R&D and zero otherwise
R&D-TO-SALES The ratio of R&D to SALES
ROA The ratio of EBITDA to total assets. Source: Amadeus
ROE The ratio of the ﬁrm net proﬁt income to the EQUITY BOOK VALUE. Source: Datastream (datatype: DWRE)
SALES Net sales or revenues. Source: Worldscope (datatype: WC01001)
SOE_D Equal to one if the ﬁrm’s largest ultimate owner is the Italian government, a local authority (county, municipality, etc.), or a
government agency and zero otherwise. Source: database used in Pazzaglia et al. (2013)
UNDERPRICING The percentage difference between the ﬁrst trading-day market price and the offer price. Source: Borsa Italiana
UP_D Equal to one if I FIRMCLDt is greater than zero and zero otherwise
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See Tables A.1 and A.2.4 We also use (i) single linkage, complete linkage, weighted-average linkage,
median linkage, centroid linkage, Ward’s linkage, and (ii) Euclidean distance
(Minkowski with argument two), squared Euclidean distance, maximum-value
distance (Minkowski with inﬁnite argument), Canberra distance, the correlation
coefﬁcient similarity measure, and the angular separation similarity measure. See Day
and Edelsbrunner (1984); in addition, see Anderberg (1973) and Gordon (1999) for
discussions on linkage methods and similarity measures, respectively.Appendix B. Cluster analysis and selection of I_FIRMCL
Cluster analysis determines the natural groupings (or clusters)
of a set of observations on the basis of the characteristics (vari-
ables) they possess, seeking to minimize the within-group variance
and to maximize the between-group variance. To perform a cluster
analysis, (i) the type of clustering, either hierarchical or partition,
(ii) the clustering linkage method, which is the criterion used to
compare the between-groups, and (iii) the measure of (dis)
similarity, which is the criterion used to compare between obser-
vations, must be chosen (e.g., Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 1990;
Everitt et al., 2011). We cluster observations upon I_FIRM using:(i) hierarchical clustering, (ii) the average clustering linkage
method, and (iii) absolute-value distance (the Minkowski distance
metric with argument one). For (ii) and (iii), we consider our
results robust because the results remain unchanged when we
re-run the analysis using almost all other available options.4 For
(i), we prefer hierarchical clustering to partition clustering to avoid
introducing exogenous elements. Indeed, in partition clustering,
the number of clusters is exogenously pre-set; therefore, let us
assume that this is equal to N⁄ and that the output of cluster analysis
is only one ‘‘clustered’’ variable assuming values from 1 to N⁄, which
is the number of the cluster to which each observation belongs. On
the other hand, hierarchical clustering ideally creates as many clus-
tered variables as the number of observations to be clustered, so let
us assume that this is equal to N. Clustered variables take values 1,
from 1 to 2, and so on, up to from 1 to N, depending on the number
of clusters in which the N-observations are endogenously grouped.
Therefore, each clustered variable deﬁnes a different number of clus-
ters. Afterwards, it is necessary to determine the optimal number of
clusters N⁄ and, accordingly, the clustered variable to consider.
Within our framework, this means ﬁnding the levels of clustering
of Italian listed ﬁrms to select the most proper clustered variable
to replace I_FIRM.
Table B.1
Selection of I_FIRMCL among I_FIRMCLN variables.
Panel A – pairwise correlations
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10
#1 I_FIRM 1
#2 I_FIRMCL2 0.8179* 1
#3 I_FIRMCL3 0.9302* 0.8733* 1
#4 I_FIRMCL 0.9411* 0.8534* 0.9826* 1
#5 I_FIRMCL5 0.9376* 0.8512* 0.9728* 0.9817* 1
#6 I_FIRMCL6 0.9399* 0.8520* 0.9732* 0.9794* 0.9950* 1
#7 I_FIRMCL7 0.9373* 0.8486* 0.9709* 0.9789* 0.9879* 0.9921* 1
#8 I_FIRMCL8 0.9331* 0.8462* 0.9666* 0.9706* 0.9851* 0.9856* 0.9888* 1
#9 I_FIRMCL9 0.9332* 0.8417* 0.9624* 0.9720* 0.9822* 0.9800* 0.9822* 0.9900* 1
#10 I_FIRMCL10 0.9140* 0.8326* 0.9520* 0.9616* 0.9752* 0.9744* 0.9745* 0.9806* 0.9877* 1
Panel B – the effects of I_FIRMCLN on MARKET-TO-BOOK
Independent variables Dependent variable: LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Constant 0.965* 0.837* 0.768 0.766 0.765* 0.736 0.717 0.715 0.705
(2.02) (1.80) (1.73) (1.73) (1.75) (1.69) (1.64) (1.63) (1.63)
I_FIRMCL2 d2 0.058
(0.83)
I_FIRMCL3 d3 0.063
(1.21)
I_FIRMCL d4 0.055**
(2.80)
I_FIRMCL5 d5 0.037**
(2.35)
I_FIRMCL6 d6 0.030**
(2.42)
I_FIRMCL7 d7 0.028**
(2.59)
I_FIRMCL8 d8 0.025**
(2.73)
I_FIRMCL9 d9 0.023**
(2.71)
I_FIRMCL10 d10 0.021**
(2.72)
I_INCOME 0.164** 0.214** 0.257*** 0.243*** 0.240*** 0.252*** 0.258*** 0.261*** 0.267***
(2.18) (2.90) (3.67) (3.44) (3.44) (3.61) (3.73) (3.71) (3.82)
DEBT-TO-ASSET 0.249 0.242 0.247 0.240 0.241 0.241 0.240 0.239 0.239
(1.28) (1.26) (1.30) (1.23) (1.24) (1.25) (1.23) (1.23) (1.24)
LN(1 + PRESS COVERAGE) 0.275*** 0.273*** 0.272*** 0.273*** 0.273*** 0.273*** 0.273*** 0.273*** 0.273***
(7.15) (7.09) (7.07) (7.09) (7.09) (7.06) (7.09) (7.13) (7.13)
LN(1 + FIRM AGE) 0.105 0.101 0.099 0.101 0.101 0.100 0.100 0.099 0.099
(1.73) (1.67) (1.63) (1.67) (1.67) (1.64) (1.64) (1.64) (1.63)
CAPEX-TO-ASSET 0.125 0.098 0.102 0.105 0.100 0.099 0.101 0.095 0.093
(0.38) (0.29) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) (0.29) (0.30) (0.28) (0.27)
ROE 0.348** 0.345** 0.346** 0.341** 0.342** 0.344** 0.343** 0.344** 0.343**
(2.22) (2.18) (2.19) (2.14) (2.15) (2.17) (2.17) (2.18) (2.16)
LN(FIRM SIZE) 0.091** 0.088** 0.088** 0.087** 0.087** 0.087** 0.087** 0.087** 0.087**
(2.82) (2.72) (2.77) (2.72) (2.74) (2.74) (2.72) (2.73) (2.74)
Observations 1268 1268 1268 1268 1268 1268 1268 1268 1268
Adjusted R-squared 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.45
Panel A presents the Spearman’s rank correlation coefﬁcients of I_FIRMCLN with I_FIRM. The sample consists of 2463 observations for Italian ﬁrms traded on the MSE over the
period 1999–2007. Panel B reports the results of the multivariate analysis of relations between LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) and I_FIRMCLN. The sample consists of 1489
observations for Italian nonﬁnancial ﬁrms traded on the MSE over the period 1999–2007, not in the FTSE MIB. Financial ﬁrms are SIC 6000–6999. I_FIRM is the (inverse)
dispersion value of listed ﬁrms around the issuing ﬁrm headquarters. I_FIRMCLN, with N = 1, 2, . . ., 10, takes values in the range 1:N according to the number of the cluster to
which each ﬁrm-year observation belongs so that the higher the cluster value, the higher the within-cluster average value of I_FIRM. I_INCOME is the (inverse) dispersion
value of household income around the issuing ﬁrm headquarters. DEBT-TO-ASSET is the ratio of total debt to total assets. PRESS COVERAGE is the yearly number of newspaper
articles concerning the corresponding ﬁrm. FIRM AGE is the number of years since the ﬁrm’s foundation. CAPEX-TO-ASSET is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets.
ROE is the ratio of net proﬁt income to the EQUITY BOOK VALUE. FIRM SIZE is the value of total assets. Also included in the regressions (but not shown) are a set of four-digit
SIC industry dummies, dummies for segment listing, and year dummies. The t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by ﬁrm and year are reported in parentheses.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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and as yet unsolved issue in the pertinent literature (e.g., Milligan
and Cooper, 1985; Gordon, 1999). We address this issue empiri-
cally. First, we cluster observations upon I_FIRM and impose a
stopping number N equal to 10 in the hierarchical algorithm to
reduce the computational burden of the analysis. Values of N equal
to 20, 30, or 40 do not change outcomes. Second, consistent with
the panel structure of our data set, we perform cluster analysison a yearly basis. Therefore, from clustering, we obtain a set of
10 clustered variables, designated I FIRMCLNYEAR with YEAR = 1999,
2000, . . ., 2007 and N = 1, 2, . . .,10. The generic variable
I FIRMCLNYEAR is deﬁned only in the respective YEAR and assumes val-
ues in the range 1–N depending on the number of clusters in which
the observations have been split. Third, for each of the 90
I FIRMCLNYEAR variables obtained from clustering, we rank and re-code
within-variable clusters in ascending order according to the
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90 variables, where the generic variable I FIRMCLN

YEAR is identical to
the corresponding I FIRMCLNYEAR except for the fact that it assumes
values from 1 to N, and the higher the cluster value is, the higher
the within-cluster average value of I_FIRM. Fourth, for each N = 1,
2, . . ., 10, by matching over YEAR the I FIRMCLN

YEAR variables, we
obtain 10 clustered versions of I_FIRM, designated I_FIRMCLN.
I_FIRMCLN is deﬁned for all sampled observations, takes value in
range 1–N, and indicates the number of the cluster to which each
observation belongs. In addition, clusters are ranked in ascending
order of I_FIRM. Finally, we determine the optimal number of clus-
ters and hence the optimal replacement for I_FIRM by investigating
the pattern of (i) the correlations of I_FIRM with I_FIRMCLN vari-
ables and (ii) the statistical signiﬁcance of the relations between
each of the I_FIRMCLN variables and MARKET-TO-BOOK. To this
end, we re-run Eq. (1) using each of the I_FIRMCLN variables instead
of I_FIRM. Therefore, we run the following set of regressions:
LNðMARKET  TO BOOKÞi;t ¼ d0 þ dN  I FIRMCLNi;t
þ d11  I INCOMEi;t þ d  Controlsi;t
þ ei;t for N ¼ 1;2; . . . ;10 ðB:1Þ
We ﬁnd that the optimal variable to replace I_FIRM is the four-
clustered-based, i.e., I_FIRMCL4 (henceforth I_FIRMCL). The results
of this selection process are reported in Table B.1.
As seen from Panel A of Table B.1, among the I_FIRMCLN vari-
ables, I_FIRMCL has the highest correlation (0.9411) with I_FIRM.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that I_FIRMCL exhibits the most similar
pattern to I_FIRM in explaining the MARKET-TO-BOOK. The coefﬁ-
cient on I_FIRMCL is negative and statistically signiﬁcant:
d4 = 0.055, p-value < 0.05. More importantly, compared with the
coefﬁcients on I_FIRMCLN variables, d4 is the closest in magnitude
to c1, which is the estimated coefﬁcient using I_FIRM (Table 3,
Model 6: c1 = 0.068, p-value < 0.01). As conclusive evidence, we
also test whether c1 = d4; ultimately, the null hypothesis is not
rejected (v2-test = 0.94, p-value = 0.33).References
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